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Abstract A (point-valued) solution for cooperative games with transferable utility, or
simply TU-games, assigns a payoff vector to every TU-game. In this paper we discuss
two classes of equal surplus sharing solutions. The first class consists of all convex
combinations of the equal division solution (which allocates the worth of the ‘grand
coalition’ consisting of all players equally over all players) and the center-of-gravity
of the imputation-set value (which first assigns every player its singleton worth and
then allocates the remainder of the worth of the grand coalition, N , equally over all
players). The second class is the dual class consisting of all convex combinations of
the equal division solution and the egalitarian non-separable contribution value (which
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first assigns every player its contribution to the ‘grand coalition’ and then allocates the
remainder equally over all players). We provide characterizations of the two classes of
solutions using either population solidarity or a reduced game consistency in addition
to other standard properties.




A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation
can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, shortly TU-game. A
(point-valued) solution on a class of TU-games assigns a payoff vector to every game
in the class.
Recently, egalitarian or equal surplus sharing solutions gained attention in the liter-
ature. Threewell-known equal surplus sharing solutions are the equal division solution
(axiomatized in van den Brink 2007), the center-of-gravity of the imputation-set value,
and the egalitarian non-separable contribution value. The equal division solution allo-
cates the worth of the ‘grand coalition’ (being the coalition consisting of all players)
equally among all players. The center-of-gravity of the imputation-set value, shortly
denoted by the CIS-value (see Driessen and Funaki 1991) first gives every agent its
own singleton worth and distributes the remainder equally among all players. The
egalitarian non-separable contribution value (also known as equal allocation of non-
separable costs), shortly denoted by the ENSC-value, is the dual of the CIS-value. In
van den Brink and Funaki (2009) the class of all convex combinations of these three
solutions is studied.
Chun and Park (2012) characterize the CIS-value by efficiency, covariance, and
population solidarity, the last property requiring that upon the arrival of a new player
all the original players should be affected in the same direction, all weakly gain or
all weakly lose. We show that all convex combinations of the equal division solution
and the CIS-value satisfy population solidarity and extend the characterization of the
CIS-value by Chun and Park (2012) to this class of solutions.
A main goal of axiomatizing solutions is to compare different solutions based
on their characterizing properties. In particular, in this paper we consider classes of
different equal surplus sharing solutions. On the one hand, by characterizing such a
class of solutions we can compare this class with other solutions. On the other hand,
to compare solutions within this class, we will consider axioms that depend on the
specific parameter determining a specific solution in this class.
Besides axiomatizing all convex combinations of the equal division solution and
the CIS-value using population solidarity, we reconsider the axiomatizations using
consistency provided by van den Brink and Funaki (2009). They axiomatized the
class of all convex combinations of the equal division solution, the CIS-value, and
the ENSC-value using a parameterized standardness for two-player games and a para-
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meterized consistency. The convex combinations of the equal division solution and
the CIS-value have a nonparameterized consistency in common which we use in an
axiomatization together with α-standardness for two-player games. For a fraction
α ∈ [0, 1], α-standardness for two-player games states that for two-player games
each player first receives a fraction α of its singleton worth, and what remains of
the worth of the ‘grand coalition’ is split equally among the two players. In van den
Brink and Funaki (2009) it is shown that any solution that satisfies efficiency, sym-
metry, and linearity on the class of two-player games satisfies α-standardness for
two-player games for some α ∈ [0, 1]. Since linearity is only used for two-player
games, and in many (economic) applications it is a technical axiom, we prefer to
have a characterization of α-standardness without linearity. On the other hand, in their
characterization of the CIS-value, Chun and Park (2012) use covariance. However,
the CIS-value is the only covariant solution in the class considered here. Therefore,
we consider a weak covariance which requires that the payoffs of all players change
by the same amount if to each coalition we add a constant times the number of play-
ers in the coalition. This property can also be seen as a weakening of the fairness
axiom in van den Brink (2001). In this paper, we also use another weakening of fair-
ness requiring that the payoffs of all players change by the same amount when we
only change the worth of the ‘grand coalition’. We show that any solution on the
class of two-player games that satisfies these two properties together with efficiency,
homogeneity, local monotonicity, and nonnegativity, satisfies α-standardness for some
α ∈ [0, 1].
To select a particular solution from the convex combinations of the equal division
solution and the CIS-value, we use α-individual rationality requiring that for appropri-
ate games a player always earns at least a fraction α ∈ [0, 1] from its singleton worth.
For specific values of α (1, respectively 0), this axiom yields the usual individual
rationality or nonnegativity.
Finally, we introduce a dual version of population solidarity that is satisfied by the
ENSC-value, the equal division solution, and all their convex combinations.
The paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 discusses some preliminaries on TU-
games and solutions. In Sect. 3, we consider two-player games and characterize α-
standardness for two-player games. In Sect. 4, we extend these definitions to n-player
games using consistency. In Sect. 5, we give an axiomatic characterization using
population solidarity. In Sect. 6 we consider the dual class consisting of all convex
combinations of the equal division solution and the ENSC-value. Finally, Sect. 7
contains some concluding remarks.
2 Preliminaries
A cooperative game with transferable utility, shortly TU-game, is a pair (N , v), where
N ⊂ N is a finite set of players with |N | ≥ 2, and v : 2N → R is a characteristic
function on N such that v(∅) = 0. For any coalition S ⊆ N , v(S) is called the worth
of coalition S. This is what the members of coalition S can obtain by agreeing to
cooperate. We denote the class of all TU-games by G. For a fixed player set N , we
denote the class of all TU-games (N , v) by GN .
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A payoff vector of game (N , v) is an |N |-dimensional real vector x ∈ RN , which
represents a distribution of the payoffs that can be earned by cooperation over the
individual players. A (point-valued) solution on a class of TU-games C ⊆ G is a
function ψ which assigns a payoff vector ψ(N , v) ∈ RN to every TU-game (N , v) ∈
C. If a solution assigns to every game a payoff vector that exactly distributes the worth
of the ‘grand coalition’ N , then the solution is efficient.1 In this paper we discuss
two classes of solutions for TU-games that all have some egalitarian flavour. A main
reason to consider this class of solutions is that we are interested in equal division
solutions but, depending on the application, players might have the right on part of
their singleton worth.
The equal division solutionEDdistributes the worth of the ‘grand coalition’ equally
among all players, i.e., for all (N , v) ∈ G and i ∈ N ,
EDi (N , v) = 1|N |v(N ).
The center-of-gravity of the imputation-set value CIS, shortly called CIS-value, first
assigns to every player its individual worth and distributes the remainder of the worth
of the ‘grand coalition’ N equally among all players, i.e., for all (N , v) ∈ G and
i ∈ N ,








In this paper, we are mainly interested in convex combinations of the equal division
solution and the CIS-value, i.e., for every α ∈ [0, 1], the corresponding solution is
defined by
ϕα(N , v) = αCIS(N , v) + (1 − α)ED(N , v). (2.1)
We denote the class of all solutions that are obtained in this way by  := {ϕα | α ∈
[0, 1]}. It is straightforward to verify that for every (N , v) ∈ G, and every α ∈ [0, 1]
and every i ∈ N , it holds that










Alternatively, we can define each solution ϕα as the CIS-value of a modified game.
For α ∈ [0, 1] and (N , v) ∈ G, define the game (N , wα) by
wα(S) =
{
αv(S) if S ⊂ N ,
v(N ) if S = N .
1 Efficient solutions are often called values.
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Then,
ϕα(N , v) = C I S(N , wα) for all α ∈ [0, 1] and (N , v) ∈ G.
Next we state some well-known properties of solutions for TU-games. Players
i, j ∈ N are symmetric in game (N , v) if v(S∪{i}) = v(S∪{ j}) for all S ⊆ N\{i, j}.
Player i ∈ N is a null player in game (N , v) if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) for all S ⊆ N\{i}.
For a game (N , v) ∈ G and a permutation π : N → N , the permuted game (N , πv) is
defined by πv(S) = v({π(i) | i ∈ S}) for all S ⊆ N . For games (N , v), (N , w) ∈ G
anda, b ∈ R, the game (N , av+bw) ∈ G is definedby (av+bw)(S) = av(S)+bw(S)
for all S ⊆ N . A game (N , v) ∈ G is nonnegative if v(S) ≥ 0 for all S ⊆ N . Finally,
a game (N , v) ∈ G is weakly essential if ∑i∈N v({i}) ≤ v(N ). A solution ψ
• satisfies efficiency on C ⊆ G if ∑i∈N ψi (N , v) = v(N ) for all (N , v) ∈ C;• satisfies symmetry on C ⊆ G if ψi (N , v) = ψ j (N , v) whenever i and j are
symmetric players in (N , v) for all (N , v) ∈ C;
• satisfies linearity on C ⊆ G if ψ(N , av + bw) = aψ(N , v) + bψ(N , w) for all
(N , v), (N , w) ∈ C and all a, b ∈ R such that (N , av + bw) ∈ C;
• satisfies covariance on C ⊆ G if for every pair of games (N , v), (N , w) ∈ C such
that there is a > 0 and b ∈ R with w(S) = av(S) + ∑i∈S bi for all S ⊆ N , it
holds that ψi (N , w) = aψi (N , v) + bi for all i ∈ N .
• satisfies individual rationality on C ⊆ G if ψi (N , v) ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N and
all weakly essential games (N , v) ∈ C;
• satisfies nonnegativity on C ⊆ G ifψi (N , v) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and all nonnegative,
weakly essential (N , v) ∈ C;
• satisfies local monotonicity on C ⊆ G if ψi (N , v) ≥ ψ j (N , v) whenever v(S ∪
{i}) ≥ v(S ∪ { j}) for all i, j ∈ N , all S ⊆ N\{i, j}, and all (N , v) ∈ C;
• satisfies α-standardness for two-player games on C ⊆ G if for every (N , v) ∈ C
with N = {i, j}, i 
= j , it holds that
ψi (N , v) = αv({i}) + 1
2
[v(N ) − α(v({i}) + v({ j}))].
The first three axioms are standard axioms often required for cooperative game
solutions. Individual rationality and nonnegativity are two different axioms that give
a lower bound to the payoffs of players. Relating to our previous remark on what right
players have on their singletonworth, individual rationality expresses that players have
full right on their singleton worths if the total worth of the grand coalition allows this.
On the other hand, even if players cannot claim their singleton worth, nonnegativity
requires that in any case no player has to pay if the worth of the grand coalition is
large enough in the sense that all singleton worths can be paid. Local monotonicity is
used in Levinský and Silársky (2004) and is also known as desirability, see Peleg and
Sudhölter (2003). It expresses that a player, who contributes to every coalition at least
as much as another player, should earn at least as much as that other player. The last
property is used by Joosten (1996) to characterize the class of α-egalitarian Shapley
values. Standardness for two players games is obtained for α = 1, and egalitarian
standardness for α = 0.
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3 Characterizations for two-player games
In the following sections we use α-standardness to characterize solutions in the class
. In order to have axiomatizations on the class  with no parameterized axiom, in
this section we first support α-standardness by showing how α-standardness can be
characterized on the class of two-player games by axioms that do not depend on α.
We denote the class of all two-player TU-games by G2.
In van den Brink and Funaki (2009, Proposition 4.2) it is shown that any solution
that satisfies efficiency, symmetry, and linearity on the class of two-player games
also satisfies α-standardness for some α ∈ [0, 1]. Since we do not need linearity
in the following sections, in this section we characterize α-standardness for two-
player games without linearity. Note that on the class of two-player games, a solution
satisfying α-standardness for some α ∈ [0, 1] is equivalent to saying that the solution
belongs to .
First, we impose an axiom stating that changing only the worth of the ‘grand
coalition’ changes the payoffs of all players by the same amount. This is a weakening
of fairness2 as used by van den Brink (2001) in axiomatizing the Shapley value.
Axiom 3.1 A solution ψ satisfies weak fairness on C ⊆ G if for every pair of games
(N , v), (N , w) ∈ C such that v(S) = w(S) for all S ⊂ N , there exists c∗ ∈ R such
that ψi (N , v) − ψi (N , w) = c∗ for all i ∈ N .
Adding homogeneity and a weak covariance property characterizes the class of
solutions , i.e., α-standardness for two-player games.
Axiom 3.2 A solution ψ satisfies homogeneity (of degree 1) on C ⊆ G if for every
game (N , v) ∈ C and c ∈ R such that (N , cv) ∈ C, it holds thatψ(N , cv) = cψ(N , v).
Axiom 3.3 A solutionψ satisfies weak covariance on C ⊆ G if for every pair of games
(N , v), (N , w) ∈ C such that there is c ∈ R with w(S) = v(S) + |S|c for all S ⊆ N ,
it holds that ψi (N , w) = ψi (N , v) + c for all i ∈ N .
Note that both axioms are weaker than covariance.3
We prove the characterization of α-standardness for two-player games by a series
of lemmas. We first fix the player set N = {1, 2}. A game (N , v) ∈ G is inessential
if
∑
i∈N v({i}) = v(N ). In the following, let G{1,2}A be the class of all inessential
(additive) games on N = {1, 2}, and let G{1,2}10 be the class of all inessential games on
N = {1, 2} such that v({1}) = 0 (and thus v({2}) = v(N )).
Lemma 3.4 A solution ψ on G{1,2}10 satisfies efficiency, homogeneity, nonnegativity,
and local monotonicity if and only if for some α ∈ [0, 1], ψ satisfies α-standardness
on G{1,2}10 .
2 A solution ψ satisfies fairness on G if ψi (N , v + z) − ψi (N , v) = ψ j (N , v + z) − ψ j (N , v) whenever
i and j are symmetric players in (N , z).
3 Note that weak covariance is also implied by efficiency and fairness (see Footnote 2) together since all
players are symmetric in the game (N , z) with z(S) = |S|c for all S ⊆ N and w = v + z.
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Proof It is obvious that each ϕα ∈  satisfies efficiency, homogeneity, nonnegativity,
and local monotonicity on G{1,2}10 . Conversely, let ψ be a solution satisfying the four
axioms. Let (N , v) ∈ G{1,2}10 such that v({2}) = 1. By nonnegativity, ψ1(N , v) ≥ 0.
By efficiency and local monotonicity, ψ2(N , v) ≥ 12 . By efficiency, there exists an
α ∈ [0, 1] such that ψ1(N , v) = 1−α2 and ψ2(N , v) = α+12 . For any (N , w) ∈ G{1,2}10 ,
since there exists c = w({2}) ∈ R such that ψ(N , w) = ψ(N , cv), by homogeneity,
we have ψ(N , w) = cψ(N , v) = (w({2})(1−α)2 , w({2})(α+1)2 ) = ϕα(N , w), as desired.unionsq
Obviously, the same holds for the class of two-player inessential games ({1, 2}, v)
with v({2}) = 0.
Without homogeneity, we can prove that the solution assigns to every game a convex
combination of the equal division solution and the CIS-value, but the solution does
need to belong to the class  since the weights given to the equal division solution
and the CIS-value need not be the same for different games.
Next, we show that adding weak covariance characterizes the α-standard solutions
on the class of all inessential (additive) games on N = {1, 2}.
Lemma 3.5 A solution ψ on G{1,2}A satisfies efficiency, homogeneity, nonnegativity,
local monotonicity, and weak covariance if and only if for some α ∈ [0, 1], ψ satisfies
α-standardness on G{1,2}A .
Proof It is obvious that solution ϕα satisfies efficiency, homogeneity, nonnegativity,
local monotonicity, and weak covariance on G{1,2}A . Conversely, let ψ be a solution
satisfying the five axioms, and (N , v) ∈ G{1,2}A . Consider a game (N , w) given
by w({i}) = v({i}) − v({1}) for i ∈ {1, 2}, and w(N ) = v(N ) − 2v({1}). By
Lemma 3.4, ψ(N , w) = ϕα(N , w) for some fixed α ∈ [0, 1]. But then weak covari-
ance implies thatψi (N , v) = ψi (N , w)+v({1}) = ϕαi (N , w)+v({1}) = ϕαi (N , v) for
i ∈ {1, 2}. unionsq
Since N is the only coalition with more than one player, adding weak fairness
implies a characterization of α-standardness for all games on N = {1, 2}.4
Theorem 3.6 A solution ψ on G{1,2} satisfies efficiency, homogeneity, nonnegativity,
local monotonicity, weak covariance, and weak fairness if and only if for some α ∈
[0, 1], ψ satisfies α-standardness on G{1,2}.
Next we show logical independence of the six axioms in Theorem 3.6 by the fol-
lowing six alternative solutions that do not satisfy α-standardness for any α ∈ [0, 1]:
1. The solution ψ given by ψi (N , v) = v({i}) for all i ∈ N and (N , v) ∈ G{1,2}
satisfies the axioms of Theorem 3.6 except efficiency.
4 In Theorem 3.6 and the preceding lemmas we can replace nonnegativity and local monotonicity by a new
axiom called weak individual rationality stating that for every weakly essential game (N , v) ∈ C and all
i ∈ N it holds that ψi (N , v) ≥ min
{
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2. The solution ψ given by ψ(N , v) = ED(N , v) if |v({1}) − v({2})| ≤ 10, and
ψ(N , v) = CIS(N , v) if |v({1}) − v({2})| > 10, satisfies the axioms of Theo-
rem 3.6 except homogeneity.
3. The solution ψ given by ψi (N , v) = 2v({i}) + v(N )−
∑
j∈N 2v({ j})
|N | for all i ∈ N
and (N , v) ∈ G{1,2} satisfies the axioms of Theorem 3.6 except nonnegativity.
4. The solution ψ given by
ψi (N , v) = C I S j (N , v) for all (N , v) ∈ G{1,2}, i 
= j,
satisfies the axioms of Theorem 3.6 except local monotonicity.
5. The solution ψ given by ψ(N , v) = ED(N , v) if v({1})
v({2}) ≤ 10, and ψ(N , v) =
CIS(N , v) if v({1})
v({2}) > 10 satisfies the axioms of Theorem 3.6 except weak covari-
ance.
6. The solution ψ given by
ψi (N , v) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
v({i}) + v(N )−v({1})−v({2})3 if v({i}) < v({ j}), j 
= i
v({i}) + 2(v(N )−v({1})−v({2}))3 if v({i}) > v({ j}), j 
= i
v(N )
2 if v({1}) = v({2}),
for all (N , v) ∈ G{1,2}, satisfies the axioms of Theorem 3.6 except weak fairness.
Note that as corollaries from Theorem 3.6 we obtain characterizations of the equal
division solution and theCIS-value,which extend ton-player gameswith the properties
of consistency and population solidarity which are discussed in the next sections. As
shown before, the equal division solution is the only solution in the class that satisfies
nonnegativity, and the CIS-value is the only solution in  that satisfies covariance or
individual rationality. With Theorem 3.6 this immediately yields axiomatizations of
the equal division solution and the CIS-value as corollaries. Further, it is obvious that
adding anonymity characterizes α-standardness on the class of all two-player games.
Next, we characterize specific solutions ϕα from the class  using a parameterized
axiom that has nonnegativity and individual rationality as special cases. For α ∈ [0, 1]
we call a game α-essential if
∑
i∈N αv({i}) ≤ v(N ). Clearly, for α = 0 this boils
down to v(N ) ≥ 0, while for α = 1 this is weak essentiality.
Axiom 3.7 Let α ∈ [0, 1]. A solution ψ satisfies α-individual rationality on C ⊆ G if
for every α-essential game (N , v) ∈ C it holds that ψi (N , v) ≥ αv({i}) for all i ∈ N .
Clearly α = 1 yields individual rationality, while α = 0 yields nonnegativity.
Earlier, we introduced weak fairness and gave a characterization of the class of
solutions for two-player games using axioms that do not dependonα inTheorem3.6.
For a specific α ∈ [0, 1], α-standardness for two-player games is characterized by
efficiency, weak fairness, and the corresponding α-individual rationality.
Theorem 3.8 Let α ∈ [0, 1]. A solution ψ on G2 satisfies efficiency, weak fairness,
and α-individual rationality if and only if it satisfies α-standardness for two-player
games.
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Proof It is obvious that on G2, ϕα satisfies efficiency, weak fairness, and α-individual
rationality. Conversely, let ψ be a solution satisfying efficiency, weak fairness, and
α-individual rationality for some α ∈ [0, 1]. Let (N , v) be a two-player game with
N = {i, j}, i 
= j . First, consider a game (N , w) given byw({i}) = v({i}), w({ j}) =
v({ j}), and w(N ) = α(v({i}) + v({ j})). Since (N , w) is an α-essential game, α-
individual rationality implies that ψi (N , w) ≥ αw({i}) = αv({i}) and ψ j (N , w) ≥
αw({ j}) = αv({ j}). Efficiency then implies that these inequalities are equalities. But
then weak fairness implies that ψi (N , v) − αv({i}) = ψ j (N , v) − αv({ j}). With
efficiency it follows that ψ(N , v) = ϕα(N , v). unionsq
Taking α = 0 and α = 1 we obtain the following corollaries.5
Corollary 3.9 (i) A solutionψ satisfies efficiency, weak fairness, and nonnegativity
if and only if it satisfies egalitarian standardness for two-player games.
(ii) A solution ψ satisfies efficiency, weak fairness, and individual rationality if and
only if it satisfies standardness for two-player games.
4 Consistency and egalitarian solutions
In this section we consider the extension of the solutions in the previous section to
n-player games.We can use the reduced game introduced by van den Brink and Funaki
(2009, Section 5), but sincewe consider only convex combinations of the equal division
solution and the CIS-value, we can make a simplification of their reduced game.
Take a game (N , v) ∈ G, a payoff vector x ∈ RN and a player j ∈ N . The player
set of the reduced game is obtained by removing player j from the original player
set N . The worths of the coalitions in this reduced game reflect what these coalitions
can earn if player j has left the game with its payoff x j . The worth of the coalition
N\{ j} (the ‘grand coalition’) in the reduced game is equal to the worth of N minus
the payoff x j assigned to player j . Clearly, this is what is left to be allocated to the
players in N\{ j} after removing player j from the game with payoff x j . For the other
coalitions S ⊂ N\{ j} we consider the projection reduced game (see, e.g., Oishi et al.
2016; Funaki and Yamato 2001) where it is assumed that coalition S simply earns its
worth v(S) in the original game.6
Definition 4.1 Given a game (N , v) ∈ G with |N | ≥ 3, a player j ∈ N and a payoff
vector x ∈ RN , the projection reduced game with respect to j and x is the game
(N\{ j}, vx ) given by
vx (S) =
{
v(N ) − x j if S = N\{ j}
v(S) if S ⊂ N\{ j}.
5 Recall that van den Brink and Funaki (2009) characterized the equal division solution (respectively CIS-
value) by efficiency, symmetry, linearity, and a weaker nonnegativity requiring nonnegative payoffs only if
the worths of all coalitions are nonnegative (respectively, individual rationality).
6 In van den Brink and Funaki (2009) it is assumed that in the reduced game a coalition has the participation
of the leaving player j (but must pay x j to j) or not. Also, because of the simplification we do not have to
consider the case |N | = 3 differently from the case |N | ≥ 4, as done in van den Brink and Funaki (2009).
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Although we can allow for different worths for coalitions of size strictly between 1
and |N |−1, we consider only the (projection) game given above.7 The corresponding
consistency property of a solution is the following:8
Definition 4.2 A solution ψ satisfies projection consistency if and only if for every
(N , v) ∈ G with |N | ≥ 3, j ∈ N , and x = ψ(N , v) it holds that ψi (N\{ j}, vx ) =
ψi (N , v) for all i ∈ N\{ j}.
Projection consistency implies that given a game (N , v), if x is a solution payoff
vector for (N , v), then for every player j ∈ N , the payoff vector xN\{ j} with payoffs
for the players in N\{ j}, must be the solution payoff vector of the projection reduced
game (N\{ j}, vx ). It is a kind of internal consistency requirement to guarantee that
players respect the recommendations made by the solution.
Proposition 4.3 For every α ∈ [0, 1] the solution ϕα satisfies projection consistency
on the class of all games G.
Proof 9Take any α ∈ [0, 1], and any (N , v) ∈ G with |N | ≥ 3. For x = ϕα(N , v) and
i ∈ N\{ j}, we have
ϕαi (N\{ j}, vx ) = αvx ({i}) +
1
|N | − 1
⎛






= αv({i}) + 1|N | − 1
⎛






= αv({i}) + 1|N | − 1
⎛














= αv({i}) + 1|N | − 1 ·








= ϕαi (N , v).
7 Here we only consider the class G of all TU-games. If one considers subclasses C ⊂ G, then in the
definition of consistency one should additionally require that the reduced game (N\{ j}, vx ) in this definition
also belongs to C.
8 The equal division solution satisfies several well-known consistency axioms that are also satisfied by the
Shapley value (Shapley 1953) such as those of Sobolev (1973) andHart andMas-Colell (1988, 1989), which
are not satisfied by the CIS-value. In van den Brink et al. (2013) it is shown that all convex combinations
of the Shapley value and equal division solution as introduced in Joosten (1996), satisfy Sobolev (1973)’s
consistency. Ju et al. (2007) consider the convex combinations of the Shapley value and the CIS-value.
9 Since we slightly changed the reduced game of van den Brink and Funaki (2009) for β = 1, we give the
short proof, which follows similar lines as that of their Proposition 5.3. Their case |N | ≥ 4 with β = 1 now
also holds for the case |N | = 3.
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unionsq
Adding α-standardness for two-player games characterizes10 the solution ϕα .
Theorem 4.4 Let α ∈ [0, 1]. A solution ψ satisfies α-standardness for two-player
games and projection consistency on the class of all games G if and only if ψ = ϕα .
Proof The solution ϕα satisfying α-standardness for two-player games is straightfor-
ward. Projection consistency follows from Proposition 4.3. Here we prove the ‘only
if’ part. Take α ∈ [0, 1], and let ψ be a solution which satisfies α-standardness for
two-player games and projection consistency. If |N | = 2, then ψ(N , v) = ϕα(N , v)
follows from α-standardness for two-player games.
Proceeding by induction, for |N | ≥ 3, suppose that ψ(N ′, v′) = ϕα(N ′, v′) when-
ever |N ′| = |N | − 1. We will show that ψ(N , v) = ϕα(N , v). Let x = ψ(N , v) and
y = ϕα(N , v). Let j ∈ N be such that |x j − y j | = min{|xk − yk | | k ∈ N }. Take any
i ∈ N\{ j}. For the two reduced games (N\{ j}, vx ) and (N\{ j}, vy), by projection
consistency of ϕα and ψ , and the induction hypothesis, we have
xi − yi = ψi (N\{ j}, vx ) − ϕαi (N\{ j}, vy) = ϕαi (N\{ j}, vx ) − ϕαi (N\{ j}, vy).
(4.1)
By definition of ϕα and the projection reduced game, we have
ϕαi (N\{ j}, vx ) − ϕαi (N\{ j}, vy)
= αvx ({i}) + 1|N | − 1
⎛






− 1|N | − 1
⎛






= αv({i}) − αv({i}) − 1|N | − 1
∑
k∈N\{ j}
(αv({k}) − αv({k})) + 1|N | − 1 (−x j + y j )
= 1|N | − 1 (−x j + y j ).
With (4.1) this implies that |xi − yi | = 1|N |−1 |x j − y j | ≤ 12 |x j − y j | since |N | ≥ 3.
From the choice of j, it follows that |x j − y j | ≤ |xi − yi | ≤ 12 |x j − y j |, which
implies that xi − yi = 0 and also x j − y j = 0. Therefore, ψ(N , v) = ϕα(N , v). This
completes the proof. unionsq
By Theorems 3.8 and 4.4, we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 4.5 Let α ∈ [0, 1]. A solution ψ satisfies efficiency, weak fairness, α-
individual rationality, and projection consistency on the class of all games G if and
only if ψ = ϕα .
10 Note that, compared to van den Brink and Funaki (2009), we do not need efficiency.
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5 Population solidarity and egalitarian solutions
Nowwe consider another extension of α-standardness to n-player games by imposing
the axiom of population solidarity. Population solidarity requires that upon the arrival
of a new player all the original players should be affected in the same direction, all
weakly gain or all weakly lose. Its implications have been studied in various contexts
(Thomson 1983; Chun 1986), and for TU-games by Chun and Park (2012).
Axiom 5.1 A solution ψ satisfies population solidarity if for all (N , v), (N ′, w) ∈ G
satisfying N ⊂ N ′ and v(S) = w(S) for all S ⊆ N , it holds that either ψ j (N , v) ≥
ψ j (N ′, w) for all j ∈ N , or ψ j (N , v) ≤ ψ j (N ′, w) for all j ∈ N .
It is easy to check that the convex combinations of the equal division solution
and the CIS-value are the only ones in the class of equal surplus division solutions
considered in van den Brink and Funaki (2009) that satisfy population solidarity. Chun
and Park (2012, Theorem 1) show that standardness for two-player games, efficiency
and population solidarity characterize the CIS-value. In a similar way we can show the
following theorem. The proof is essentially the same as that in Chun and Park (2012)
and can be found in the appendix.
Theorem 5.2 Let α ∈ [0, 1]. A solution ψ satisfies efficiency, α-standardness for
two-player games and population solidarity if and only if ψ = ϕα .
Logical independence of the axioms in Theorem 5.2 follows from the following
three alternative solutions:




v(T ) − α ∑k∈T
v({k})) for all (N , v) ∈ G and i ∈ N , satisfies α-standardness for two-player
games and population solidarity. It does not satisfy efficiency.
2. For all i ∈ N, let ti be a number assigned to player i , such that these numbers are
distinct. The solution ψ , for all (N , v) ∈ G given by ψ(N , v) = ϕα(N , w), where
(N , w) is a game such that w({i}) = tiv({i}) for all i ∈ N and w(S) = v(S)
for any other S, satisfies efficiency and population solidarity. It does not satisfy
α-standardness for two-player games.
3. The egalitarian Shapley values satisfy efficiency andα-standardness for two-player
games. It does not satisfy population solidarity.
By Theorems 3.8 and 5.2, we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 5.3 Let α ∈ [0, 1]. A solution ψ satisfies efficiency, weak fairness, α-
individual rationality, and population solidarity if and only if ψ = ϕα .
Theorem 5.2 characterizes each solution ϕα, α ∈ [0, 1]. It is an immediate conse-
quence of Theorems 3.6 and 5.2 that adding anonymity characterizes all solutions on
G, that is a solutionψ on G belongs to if and only if it satisfies efficiency, homogene-
ity, localmonotonicity, nonnegativity, weak covariance, weak fairness, anonymity, and
population solidarity. It turns out that we can even do without anonymity. To show
this it is sufficient to prove that under efficiency and population solidarity, α does not
depend on the choice of the player set.
123
Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian… 439
For any (N , v) ∈ G and T ⊂ N , the subgame (T, vT ) is given by vT (S) = v(S)
for all S ⊆ T .
Theorem 5.4 A solution ψ on G belongs to  if and only if it satisfies efficiency,
homogeneity, local monotonicity, nonnegativity, weak covariance, weak fairness, and
population solidarity.
Proof It is clear that the ‘only if’ part is satisfied. To show the ‘if’ part, byTheorems 3.6
and 5.2 it is sufficient to prove that under efficiency and population solidarity, a solution
that satisfies α-standardness for games on a player set N = {i, j}, i 
= j , must satisfy
the same α-standardness on any class of games on player sets N ′ ⊂ N with |N ′| = 2.
Letψ be a solution that satisfies efficiency, population solidarity, and αi j -standardness
for two-player games on G{i, j} for any i, j ∈ N. We will show that αi j = αi ′ j ′ for any
i, j, i ′, j ′ ∈ N.
Suppose by contradiction that there exist i, j, k ∈ N such that αi j 
= αik . For
simplicity, we assume that i = 1, j = 2, k = 3, and α12 > α13. Let δ and 	 be positive
real numbers such that
α12 − α13 < δ < 2(α12 − α13)
0 < 	 < 2α12 − 2α13 − δ.
Then it follows that
3α12 + 2α13 + δ < 5α12 − 	.
Now, consider the following game (N , v) ∈ G where N = {1, 2, 3} and v is defined
as follows:
S {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {2, 3} {1, 3}
v(S) 1 2 2 3α12 4α12 − 2	 3α13 + 2δ
and v(N ) is any real number satisfying
3α12 + 2α13 + δ < v(N ) < 5α12 − 	. (5.1)
Note that, by αi j -standardness for two-player games,
ψ1({1, 2}, v{1,2}) = α12 + 1
2
(3α12 − 3α12) = α12
ψ2({1, 2}, v{1,2}) = 2α12 + 1
2
(3α12 − 3α12) = 2α12
ψ2({2, 3}, v{2,3}) = 2α23 + 1
2
(4α12 − 2	 − 4α23) = 2α12 − 	
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ψ3({2, 3}, v{2,3}) = 2α23 + 1
2
(4α12 − 2	 − 4α23) = 2α12 − 	
ψ1({1, 3}, v{1,3}) = α13 + 1
2
(3α13 + 2δ − 3α13) = α13 + δ
ψ3({1, 3}, v{1,3}) = 2α13 + 1
2
(3α13 + 2δ − 3α13) = 2α13 + δ.
We distinguish the following three cases:
1. Suppose that ψ1(N , v) < α12. Applying population solidarity to ({1, 2}, v{1,2})
and (N , v) yields ψ2(N , v) ≤ 2α12. Since α12 < α13 + δ, it follows that
ψ1(N , v) < α13 + δ. Applying population solidarity to ({1, 3}, v{1,3}) and (N , v)
yields ψ3(N , v) ≤ 2α13 + δ. Then,
v(N ) = ψ1(N , v) + ψ2(N , v) + ψ3(N , v) < α12 + 2α12 + 2α13 + δ
= 3α12 + 2α13 + δ,
a contradiction to (5.1).
2. Suppose that ψ1(N , v) > α12. Applying population solidarity to ({1, 2}, v{1,2})
and (N , v) yields ψ2(N , v) ≥ 2α12. Since ψ2(N , v) > 2α12 − 	, applying popu-
lation solidarity to ({2, 3}, v{2,3}) and (N , v) yields ψ3(N , v) ≥ 2α12 − 	. Then,
v(N ) = ψ1(N , v) + ψ2(N , v) + ψ3(N , v) > α12 + 2α12 + 2α12 − 	
= 5α12 − 	,
a contradiction to (5.1).
3. Suppose that ψ1(N , v) = α12. Then, ψ1(N , v) < α13 + δ. Applying population
solidarity to ({1, 3}, v{1,3}) and (N , v) yields ψ3(N , v) ≤ 2α13 + δ. Since 2α13 +
δ < 2α12 − 	, it holds that ψ3(N , v) < 2α12 − 	. Applying population solidarity
to ({2, 3}, v{2,3}) and (N , v) yields ψ2(N , v) ≤ 2α12 − 	. Then, since ψ3(N , v) ≤
2α13 + δ and ψ2(N , v) ≤ 2α12 − 	,
v(N ) = ψ1(N , v) + ψ2(N , v) + ψ3(N , v) ≤ α12 + 2α12 − 	 + 2α13 + δ
< 3α12 + 2α13 + δ,
a contradiction to (5.1).
unionsq
We note that in this theorem, homogeneity, local monotonicity, nonnegativity, weak
covariance, and weak fairness can be replaced by symmetry and linearity.
6 The ENSC-value
The dual game (N , v∗) of a game (N , v) is the game that assigns to each coalition
S ⊆ N the worth that is lost by the ‘grand coalition’ N if coalition S leaves N , i.e.,
v∗(S) = v(N ) − v(N\S) for all S ⊆ N .
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The ENSC-value assigns to every game (N , v) the CIS-value of its dual game, i.e.,
for all i ∈ N ,













(v(N ) − v(N\{ j}))
⎞
⎠








Thus, the ENSC-value assigns to every player in a game its marginal contribution
to the ‘grand coalition’ and distributes the (positive or negative) remainder equally
among the players.
It is known that the ENSC-value is the dual of the CIS-value and has several dual
properties, see, e.g., Funaki (1998) and Oishi et al. (2016). In this section we present
two properties for values that are defined as a convex combination of the ENSC-value
and the equal division solution. These properties are induced from the theorems in the
previous two sections by their duality. Thus we omit the proofs of the two theorems.
Note that for two-player games, both solutions coincide (with any standard solution).
For each α ∈ [0, 1], let ϕα , for all (N , v) ∈ G, be given by
ϕα(N , v) = αENSC(N , v) + (1 − α)ED(N , v). (6.1)
It is easy to check that the solution ϕα is the dual of ϕα , that is, ϕα(N , v) = ϕα(N , v∗)
(N , v) ∈ G.
From Oishi et al. (2012, 2016) it follows that, for any game (N , v) ∈ G with
|N | ≥ 3, a player j ∈ N , and a payoff vector x ∈ RN , the dual of the projection
reduced game defined in Definition 4.2 (we call this the dual projection reduced game
with respect to j and x) is the game (N\{ j}, (vx )∗) given by
(vx )∗(S) =
{
v(S ∪ { j}) − x j if S ⊆ N\{ j}, S 
= ∅
0 if S = ∅.
The consistency property related to this reduced game is called dual projection
consistency and is defined similarly as Definition 4.2. Together with α-standardness
for two-player games it characterizes the corresponding convex combination of the
equal division solution and the CIS-value.
Theorem 6.1 Let α ∈ [0, 1]. A solution φ satisfies α-standardness for two-player
games and dual projection consistency on the class of all games G if and only if
φ = ϕα .
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Nowwe consider the dual property of population solidarity. It is obtained by replac-
ing (N , v) by (N , v∗) in the original property. For a game (N ′, w) and N ⊂ N ′, let
w¯(S) = w(S ∪ (N ′\N )) for all S ⊆ N .
Axiom 6.2 A solution ψ satisfies the dual of population solidarity if for all
(N , v), (N ′, w) ∈ G satisfying N ⊂ N ′ and v(N ) − v(N\S) = w¯(N ) − w¯(N\S)
for all S ⊆ N , it holds that either ψ j (N , v) ≥ ψ j (N ′, w) for all j ∈ N , or
ψ j (N , v) ≤ ψ j (N ′, w) for all j ∈ N .
The dual of population solidarity requires the following:Consider two games (N , v)
and (N ′, w) such that N ⊂ N ′. We compare the worth of the coalitions in the two
games for the player set N . Then we consider w¯ instead of w. If for any S ⊆ N , the
contributions of S to N in both games coincide, all the original players in N should
be affected in the same direction.
Theorem 6.3 Let α ∈ [0, 1]. A solution φ satisfies efficiency, α-standardness for
two-player games and the dual of population solidarity if and only if φ = ϕα .
Since ϕα satisfies α-standardness for two-player games, we can formulate a corol-
lary similar to Corollary 4.5.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper,we showed that all convex combinations of the equal division solution and
the CIS-value satisfy population solidarity, and we provided an axiomatization of the
class of these solutions using population solidarity. For every specific solution in this
class we provided an axiomatization using projection consistency and a paramatrized
standardness axiom. Similar characterizations are obtained for convex combinations
of the equal division solution and the ENSC-value.
A main goal of axiomatizing solutions is to compare different solutions based
on their characterizing properties. Using the axiomatizations obtained in this paper
we can (i) distinguish the class of solutions considered here from other solutions by
the axiomatization using population solidarity (Theorem 5.4), and within this class
distinguish each solution by its corresponding standardness for two-player games
(Theorem 4.4).
One of the most applied solutions for TU-games is the Shapley value. In the lit-
erature there exist axiomatizations of the egalitarian Shapley values (being convex
combinations of the Shapley value and the equal division solution, see, e.g., Joosten
(1996) and van den Brink et al. (2013) and generalized consensus values (being con-
vex combinations of the Shapley value and the equal surplus division solution (see Ju
et al. 2007). A next question for future research is to obtain axiomatizations of convex
combinations considered here and the Shapley value.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
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Appendix: Proof of Theorem 5.2
Here we present the proof of Theorem 5.2 which generalizes that of Chun and Park
(2012) in a straightforward way. First, it is obvious that ϕα satisfies efficiency, α-
standardness for two-player games and population solidarity.
To prove uniqueness, let ψ be a solution satisfying efficiency, α-standardness for
two-player games and population solidarity. We assume that N = {1, . . . , n}. For any
game (N , v) ∈ G and α ∈ [0, 1], we define the real number xα(N , v) by




and we also define a vector θα(N , v) ∈ RN by θαi (N , v) = ψi (N , v)−αv({i}) for all
i ∈ N . For notational convenience, in case there is no confusion we will often omit
the superscript α and shortly write x(N , v) and θ(N , v). Note that from efficiency,
∑
i∈N
θi (N , v) =
∑
i∈N
ψi (N , v) − α
∑
i∈N
v({i}) = v(N ) − α
∑
i∈N
v({i}) = x(N , v) · |N |.
(7.1)
If |N | = 2, then ψ(N , v) = ϕα(N , v) follows from the assumption that ψ satisfies
α-standardness for two-player games. Let (N , v) ∈ G with |N | ≥ 3. For simplicity,
let N = {1, 2, 3, . . . , n}. It is sufficient to show that θi (N , v) = x(N , v) for all i ∈ N .
We will show this by contradiction. Suppose that there is a player k ∈ N such that
θk(N , v) 
= x(N , v). Since ∑i∈N θi (N , v) = x(N , v) · |N |, there exists a player
j ∈ N such that θ j (N , v) > x(N , v). Without loss of generality, we may assume that
θ1(N , v) − x(N , v) > 0.
Let δ be a positive real number defined by
δ ≡ θ1(N , v) − x(N , v)
2(n + 1)2 .
Let N ′ ≡ {1, 2, . . . , n + 1} and N ′′ ≡ {1, 2, . . . , n + 1, n + 2}. We consider a game
(N ′′, w) such that for all S ⊂ N , w(S) = v(S), and w satisfies the following:
S w(S)
{i, n + 1} for i ∈ N\{1} αw({i}) + αw({n + 1}) + 2(x(N , v) + δ)
{i, n + 2} for i ∈ N\{1} αw({i}) + αw({n + 2}) + 2(x(N , v) + 2δ)
{1, n + 1} αw({1}) + αw({n + 1}) + 2(x(N , v) + 2(n + 1)2δ)
{1, n + 2} αw({1}) + αw({n + 2}) + 2(x(N , v) + (2n + 3)δ)
{n + 1, n + 2} αw({n + 1}) + αw({n + 2}) + 2(x(N , v) + 32 δ)
N ′ α ∑n+1i=1 w({i}) + (n + 1)(x(N , v) + (2n + 2)δ)
N ′′ α ∑n+2i=1 w({i}) + (n + 2)(x(N , v) + (2n + 2)δ)
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For simplicity, for any S ⊆ N ′′, the subgame of (N ′′, w) induced by S is denoted by
(S, w).
From the previous table and from the fact that ψ is equal to ϕα for all two-player
games, we have the following: for i ∈ N\{1},
θi ({i, n + 1}, w) = θn+1({i, n + 1}, w) = x({i, n + 1}, w) = x(N , v) + δ
(7.2)
θi ({i, n + 2}, w) = θn+2({i, n + 2}, w) = x({i, n + 2}, w) = x(N , v) + 2δ
(7.3)
and for i ∈ {n + 1, n + 2},
θi ({n + 1, n + 2}, w) = x({n + 1, n + 2}, w) = x(N , v) + 3δ
2
. (7.4)
In addition, it holds that
θ1({1, n + 1}, w) = θn+1({1, n + 1}, w) = x({1, n + 1}, w)
= x(N , v) + 2(n + 1)2δ (7.5)
θ1({1, n + 2}, w) = θn+2({1, n + 2}, w) = x({1, n + 2}, w)
= x(N , v) + (2n + 3)δ (7.6)
x(N ′, w) = x(N ′′, w) = x(N , v) + 2(n + 1)δ. (7.7)








′′, w) = (n + 2)x(N ′′, w) = (n + 2)x(N , v) + 2(n + 1)(n + 2)δ.
(7.9)
Next, we prove several claims.
Claim 1 θ1(N ′, w) = x(N , v) + 2(n + 1)2δ.
Proof of Claim 1 Suppose that θ1(N ′, w) > x(N , v) + 2(n + 1)2δ. Since x(N , v) +
2(n + 1)2δ = θ1(N , v) by the definition of δ, θ1(N ′, w) > θ1(N , v). Applying
population solidarity to (N , v) and (N ′, w), it holds that θi (N ′, w) ≥ θi (N , v) for all







θi (N , v). (7.10)
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′, w) = (n + 1)x(N , v) + 2(n + 1)2δ − θn+1(N ′, w),
and
∑n
i=1 θi (N , v) = nx(N , v). It follows by (7.10) that (n+1)x(N , v)+2(n+1)2δ−
θn+1(N ′, w) > nx(N , v) or θn+1(N ′, w) < x(N , v) + 2(n + 1)2δ. By (7.5), this is
equivalent to θn+1(N ′, w) < θn+1({1, n + 1}, w). Applying population solidarity to
({1, n + 1}, w) and (N ′, w), it holds that with (7.5) that
θ1(N
′, w) ≤ θ1({1, n + 1}, w) = x(N , v) + 2(n + 1)2δ,
which is a contradiction to the assumption that θ1(N ′, w) > x(N , v) + 2(n + 1)2δ. If
θ1(N ′, w) < x(N , v)+2(n+1)2δ, we can reach a contradiction similarly. Therefore,
Claim 1 holds. unionsq
Claim 2 θn+1(N ′, w) ≤ x(N , v) + δ.
Proof of Claim 2 Suppose that θn+1(N ′, w) > x(N , v) + δ. By (7.2), we have
θn+1(N ′, w) > θn+1({i, n + 1}, w) for all i ∈ N\{1}. Applying population soli-
darity to ({i, n + 1}, w) and (N ′, w) for each i ∈ N\{1}, we obtain θi (N ′, w) ≥
θi ({i, n + 1}, w) for each i ∈ N\{1}. By (7.2), θi (N ′, w) ≥ x(N , v) + δ for all
i ∈ N\{1}. All together with Claim 1, we have
θ1(N
′, w) = x(N , v) + 2(n + 1)2δ
θi (N
′, w) ≥ x(N , v) + δ for all i ∈ N\{1}
θn+1(N ′, w) > x(N , v) + δ,
and so
∑n+1
i=1 θi (N ′, w) > (n+1)x(N , v)+2(n+1)2δ+nδ,which contradicts (7.8).
Therefore, Claim 2 holds. unionsq
Claim 3 θi (N ′′, w) > θi (N ′, w) for some i ∈ N ′.
Proof of Claim 3 Suppose that θi (N ′′, w) ≤ θi (N ′, w) for all i ∈ N ′. Then
θn+1(N ′′, w) ≤ θn+1(N ′, w) ≤ x(N , v) + δ < x(N , v) + 3
2
δ
= θn+1({n + 1, n + 2}, w),
where the second inequality follows from Claim 2, and the last equality follows from
(7.4). Applying population solidarity to ({n + 1, n + 2}, w) and (N ′′, w), we have
θn+2(N ′′, w) ≤ θn+2({n + 1, n + 2}, w). Since, from (7.3) and (7.4), for all i ∈
N\{1},
θn+2(N ′′, w) ≤ θn+2({n + 1, n + 2}, w) = x(N , v) + 3
2
δ < x(N , v) + 2δ
= θn+2({i, n + 2}, w),
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it follows that for all i ∈ N\{1}, θn+2(N ′′, w) < θn+2({i, n + 2}, w). Apply-
ing population solidarity to ({i, n + 2}, w) and (N ′′, w), it holds that θi (N ′′, w) ≤
θi ({i, n + 2}, w) for all i ∈ N\{1}. By (7.3), θi (N ′′, w) ≤ x(N , v) + 2δ for all
i ∈ N\{1}. All together with Claim 1, we have
θ1(N
′′, w) ≤ θ1(N ′, w) = x(N , v) + 2(n + 1)2δ
θi (N
′′, w) ≤ x(N , v) + 2δ for all i ∈ N\{1}
θn+1(N ′′, w) ≤ x(N , v) + δ





i=1 θi (N ′′, w) ≤ (x(N , v)+2(n+1)2δ)+(n−1)(x(N , v)+2δ)+(x(N , v)+




′′, w) ≤ (n + 2)x(N , v) +
(




< (n + 2)x(N , v) + 2(n + 1)(n + 2)δ,
which yields a contradiction to (7.9). Therefore, Claim 3 holds. unionsq
Claim 4 θi (N ′′, w) < θi (N ′, w) for some i ∈ N ′.
Proof of Claim 4 Suppose that θi (N ′′, w) ≥ θi (N ′, w) for all i ∈ N ′. Then
θ1(N
′′, w) ≥ θ1(N ′, w) = x(N , v) + 2(n + 1)2δ > x(N , v) + (2n + 3)δ
= θ1({1, n + 2}, w),
where the second equality follows from Claim 1, and the last equality follows
from (7.6). Applying population solidarity to ({1, n + 2}, w) and (N ′′, w), we have
θn+2(N ′′, w) ≥ θn+2({1, n + 2}, w). Then
θn+2(N ′′, w) ≥ θn+2({1, n + 2}, w) = x(N , v) + (2n + 3)δ > x(N , v) + 2(n + 1)δ,
where the second equality follows from (7.6). Since θi (N ′′, w) ≥ θi (N ′, w) for all








′, w) + (x(N , v) + 2(n + 1)δ).
By (7.8) and (7.9),
(n + 2)x(N , v) + 2(n + 1)(n + 2)δ > (n + 1)x(N , v) + 2(n + 1)2δ
+ (x(N , v) + 2(n + 1)δ),
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where the right side is (n + 2)x(N , v) + 2(n + 1)(n + 2)δ, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, Claim 4 holds. unionsq
From Claims 3 and 4, we reach a contradiction to population solidarity applied to
(N ′, w) and (N ′′, w). It completes the proof of Theorem 5.2.
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